The first two rounds of the Palestinian national dialogue hosted by Cairo at the beginning and end of 2003 contributed greatly to bridging the gaps between participants. It was the third round, however, that achieved the major breakthrough, which is reflected in the Cairo Declaration.

Several developments helped prepare the ground for this achievement. One was Hamas's decision, emulated by other militant factions, to abide by a ceasefire on condition that Israel reciprocated. The question of the restoration of calm -- or a ceasefire -- was one of the issues that had remained unresolved in the first two rounds of the national dialogue. Also, Hamas's resounding announcement that it would take part in the 2005 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections effectively signaled that it was willing to integrate with both the Palestinian Authority (PA) as well as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in view of the fact that parliamentary membership automatically confers membership in the PLO National Council. This effectively resolved the question of a unified framework for the Palestinian movement Hamas and the Islamist movement in general, developed outside the PLO umbrella. Previously, Hamas had insisted that any integration must preserve the PLO and Islamist movement as two distinct entities, arguing variously for a redrafting of the PLO Charter or the creation of a new umbrella organisation under which both entities would be subordinate.

On deciding to participate in legislative elections, Hamas will take its place in existing political institutions -- the PLO and the PA -- without stipulating prior agreement over political objectives or organisational structures. In so doing, it has resolved, in principle, a critical issue that had thwarted the first two rounds of dialogue.

The electoral process itself is producing rapid changes in the Palestinian political system at the PA level. In addition to the presidential elections held 9 January, the first phase of municipal council elections was held 23 December in the West Bank and 26 January in Gaza, with the remainder of the municipal elections and the PLC elections to be completed by 17 July. The elections stimulated heated controversy over electoral laws and over the principle of proportional representation, with the first round of municipal elections coming as a shock to the ruling Fatah party. Of the 10 municipalities in which elections were held, Hamas won a majority in seven, which enhanced confidence in the electoral process and, simultaneously, strengthened the conviction in the principle of proportional representation.

The third round of the Palestinian national dialogue took place against a backdrop of increasing international focus on Palestinian electoral campaigns and the Israeli "disengagement" plan for Gaza -- its first political initiative since the outbreak of the Intifada, one that it intends to put into effect as of 20 July. Israel is keen for relative calm to prevail in order to stage a smooth and dignified withdrawal, as opposed to one that could be portrayed as a humiliating defeat for its forces and the occupation, as was the case with its withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May 2000. Palestinian moves to restore calm have intersected with Israel's desire to create optimal conditions for its disengagement plan, a desire complicated by the dissension Sharon has met from Israeli settlers and from within the Likud Party. Simultaneously, the progress of Palestinian elections has so far met the expectations of the international community, keen to see the completion of this process as one of the preliminary steps towards the resumption of the roadmap.

This is not to suggest that all was rosy before participants met in Cairo. However, the scene was set for participants to exercise their dynamism, spirit of initiative and ability to take crucial decisions at the right moment, thereby making it possible to translate trends and tendencies into substantive and cohesive tasks and aims that were embodied in the Cairo Declaration. Otherwise put, the participants did not merely take preceding developments and move them ahead; nor was their conference shaped exclusively by those developments, even if it moved in the direction of their trajectory. What the conference achieved was to give concrete shape to the issues that preceded it, elevate them to the peeks of the national agenda, weave diverse threads together into a uniform fabric and furnish a forward looking vision for the Palestinian movement as it forges towards the realisation of national rights.

The restoration of calm to help enable the Israeli departure from Gaza with as few retaliatory re-incursions as possible, the completion of municipal elections and the holding of legislative elections, comprehensive reform and preparations for the long- awaited convention of the Palestinian National Council -- these were the concerns that still loomed on the eve of the Palestinian conference in Cairo. As long as these issues remained general bullet points, they would not stir major differences between the various factions or trigger a significant departure from the PA line. However, everyone knew that it would be another story when participants began to probe below the headlines and seek a consensus over principles and mechanisms that would govern the performance of national tasks over coming months. Would these talks end up reproducing the status quo with all its well-known deficiencies, or would they produce a qualitative leap beyond present difficulties and open up the prospect for future development?

First, it was necessary to resolve a question of focus. Should participants look beyond the end of the year to preparations for final status negotiations and set aside questions of domestic reform on the grounds that solid, reliable progress is being made? This was the opinion of President Abbas. The opposing view was to couple the questions of internal reform with the 2005 national agenda. Some further held that it was pointless to dwell on anything beyond that since it was unlikely Israel would be willing to resume negotiations soon. Ultimately, this was the view that prevailed.

Did it follow that there was a relationship established between the principle of ceasefire and domestic arrangements whereby progress in the latter is contingent upon the stability of the former and whereby Fatah's opposition would be rewarded for its commitment to the former by concessions in the latter? Such a contention is imprecise, its weak point residing in the reciprocal formula that hints at cohesion between the conflicting interests of constituents of the opposition. In addition, it fails to clarify why it is in the higher national interests of all -- the PA and opposition alike -- to pursue the restoration of calm and domestic reforms as two sides of the same coin. Perhaps it is more accurate, in light of the commonly held conviction over the need for unity of rank, that the restoration of calm will facilitate progress in domestic arrangements which, in turn, will work to fortify calm, which, still further, can be used to strengthen national cohesion that likely will needed to confront the formidable challenges that await on the road ahead.

The principle of restoration of calm represents a crossroads. Each of those standing at this juncture arrived there from a certain point of departure and has a certain perception of where he wants to go and how to get there. There are those who regard a ceasefire as an essential prerequisite for halting, as Mahmoud Abbas termed it, the "militarization of the Intifada" and enabling the resumption of negotiations. This position is founded on the premise that while the Palestinians may not have a firm guarantee that the occupying power will reciprocate, it would be difficult for it not to. Proponents of this position put great faith in the efficacy of international pressure. Accordingly, advocates of this position maintain that a ceasefire should not be bound by a timeframe, whether before negotiations as a prerequisite for resumption or after negotiations in order that they continue.